Unemployment Effects of Military Spending: Evidence from a Panel of States by Mark Hooker & Michael Knetter
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
UNEMPLOYMENT EFFECtSOF
MILITARY SPENDING: EVIDENCE
FROM A PANEL OF STATES
Mark Hooker
Michael Knetter
Working Paper No. 4889




We would like to thank Bill Emmons, Andrew Oswald, and members of the Dartmouth
economics department's junior lunch seminar for helpful comments and discussion. We also
thank Michael Berger of the Department of Defense for assistancewiththe data. This paper is
part of NBER's reseaxch programs in Economic fluctuations and Labor Studies. Any opinions
expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
1994 by Mark Hooker and Michael Knetter. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,




FROM A PANEL OF STATES
ABSTRACT
We use data on a panel of states over a 30 year sample to estimate the response of
unemployment to military procurement spending. The state panel provides greater variation in
both variablesandpermits us to examine whether responses to procurement spending shocks vary
acrossstates.Our main finding is that changes in procurement spending significantly affect
unemployment in states heavily dependent on the military sector and subject to large such
changes, and that accounting for this variation in responses across states adds approximately 40%
to the estimated aggregate unemployment impact of the current drawdown.
Mark Hooker Michael Knetter
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Danmouth College Dartmouth College
Hanover, NH 03755 Hanover, NH 03755
and NBERUnemployment Effects of Military Spending:
Evidence from a PanelofStates'
Mark Hooker and Michael Knetter
The ongoing reductions in military spendinghave revived policyinterest in the
relationship betweenmilitary spending andaggregatefluctuations.' A varietyof
conventionalmacroeconomicmodelssuggest that changes in militaryspendingaffect
economicactivity,at least intheshort run.Themechanism bywhichdefense purchases
affectoutputvaries across models. Militaryspendingaffects output through shiftsin
aggregate demand in modelsinthe Keynesian tradition. Other models emphasize the
reallocationofresources that occurs when spending changes across sectorsofthe economy
andtheconsequent lossof output and increasein measuredunemploymentduring the
transition period.2
Thestudies whichaccompaniedplans to downsize the militaryin recentyears
generally concluded that the proposed reduction in militaryspending,which amounts to a 3
percentage point reduction in its share of GDPovera 10-year period,would haverelatively
minor effects onthemacroeconomy. Simulationresults from macroeconometric models
suggest, for example, that the planned drawdown will reduce annualoutputgrowth by
about 0.25 to0.50percentage points over the 1993 to 1995 period)Okun'sLaw would
thus imply a contribution to unemployment on the orderof oneortwo tenthsof a
percentage point peryear.Consistent with such a small impact,Shea(1992) finds that
militaryspending isnot a statistically significant determinant of output inany 2-digit
'
We would like to thank Bill Emmons, AndrewOswald,and members of the Dartmouth economics
department'sjuniorlunchseminar for helpfulcommmentsand discussion.We also thankMichael Berger of
theDepartmentof Defense for assistance with the data.
A number of studies have emerged from think tanks, suchasthe Defense Budget Project and the
Economic Policy Institute, government commissions, the Congressional Budget Office, as well as
academics.
2 Lilien's (1982) investigation of the role of sectoral shifts inaggregate unemployment started a large
literature on thistopic.
3Such estimates appear in the CBO analysisandthe reportbythe DefenseConversionCommission.
1 8/25/94manufacturing industry.
Other empirical observations, however, suggest that militaryspendingchanges
have had large effects on the economy. Defense drawdowns associated with the conflicts
in Korea and Vietnam have tended to coincide with downturns in the overall economy.4
Figure 1 shows that the Korean buildup was associated with a decline in unemployment of
about 3 percentage points, while the subsequent drawdown was associated with a rise in
unemployment that was nearly as large. Similarly, the Vietnam buildup that occurred
during the Johnson Administration was associated with declining unemployment, while
unemployment rates rose soon after spendingon the Vietnam conflict fell.
Furthermore, the geographic distribution of unemployment increases in the recent
recession seems to be highly correlated with the distribution of defense spending. Four of
the states most heavily dependent on defense purchases—Connecticut, Virginia,
Massachusetts, and California—experienced a combined increase in their unemployment
rates that was over two-and-one-half times the increase in the rest of the United States in
the four year period ending in September 1992. Of the major manufacturing sectors in the
economy, the largest decline in employment in the 1989-1992 period occurred in
transportation equipment, with nearly two-thirds of that loss concentrated in aerospace
(aircraft and guided missiles). This leads us to believe that the distributional effects of
defense spending are important and that macroeconomeiric simulations based only on
aggregate data may be misleading.
Overall, there appears to be somewhat of a puzzle surrounding the true impact of
defense spending on short run fluctuations in the economy. Macroeconometric models
seem to agree that military spending changes of the magnitude we have seen since the
'Therewas a sharp fall in output and rise in unemploymentfollowingWorld War Ii; more modest effects
were associated with the spending reductions near the end of the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. It should be
noted, however, that changes in defense spending as a share of the economy were larger in these previous
episodes than the current reductions. The Vietnam diawdown entailed a decline of 4.8 percentage points in
the share of ODP devoted to defense over a 10-year period. This compares with a projected decline of 2.9
percentage points over 11 years in the current environment. See the rcport of the Defense Conversion..,
Commission.
See the 1993 Economic Report of the President, pp. 89-90.
2 8/25/94World War II drawdown are too small to have big effects on the economy. Nonetheless,
past defense drawdowns appear to have coincided with national recessions and the regional
distribution of unemployment during the most recent recession is consistent with the view
thatongoingor impending defense spending reductions played an important role. This
paper will attemptto characterizethe empirical relationshipbetweenmilitary spending and
udemployment byexaminingthebehavior ofunemployment and procurement spending by
state sincetheearly l960s.The panelofstates provides uswith considerablymore
variationthan exists in the aggregatetimeseries. Our focus on procurement spending is a
consequence of our lack of state-specific data on other forms of military spending.
Procurement spending accounts for less than 50%ofthe current drawdown and
approximately 30% of total military spending.
We begin by discussing the empirical framework and data used to study the
behavior of state unemployment rates. We then estimate reduced-form models of state
unemployment rates and test a variety of resuictions in an attempt to identify key features of
the relationship between procurement spending and unemployment rates. Our main finding
is that changes in procurement spending significantly affect unemployment in those states
most dependent on the military sector, and that allowing for variation across states in the
response of unemployment to procurement spending adds approximately 40% to the
estimated aggregate unemployment impact of the cunent drawdown. The paper concludes
with some discussion of the implications of our results and possible mechanisms that might
generate them.
1. The Empirical Model
The main objective of this paper is to esthte the impact of military spending on
unemployment, using variation across states and over time to identify responses. One
possible approach to the problem would be to estimate a structural model of labor market
equilibrium, which would include determination of employment, labor force participation,
3 8,25/94and wage rates, as well as unemployment for each state. However, labor supply, labor
demand, and labor market equilibrium are extremely difficult to model empirically. This is
particularly true given that our sample must cover a thirty-year period in order to capture
just two big swings in defense procurement. Thus, we estimate a system of reduced-form
unemployment equations for the fifty states plus the District of Columbia.
The specification we estimate is motivated by standard theories of labor market
equilibrium, as surveyed in Nickell (1990). We take the view that each state has along-run
equilibrium level of unemployment which will depend on minimum wages, environmental
and labor market regulations, industry mix, unemployment benefits, and other possibly
state-specific factors, but that unemployment deviates from long-mn equilibrium due to
various shocks, including changes in military procurement spending. The response of
unemployment to shocks will be allowed to vary across states to some degree.
We follow the approach of Marston (1985) and more recently Davis, Loungani, and
Mahidhara (1992) in specifying our equations for state unemployment rates. Marston uses
an error components model to decompose variation in state unemployment rates into time
and state effects. The state-specific effects capture institutional features that are relatively
constant over time but vary across states, giving rise to different long-mn equilibrium rates
of unemployment. The time effects capture the impact of factors common to all states that
vary over time, such as demographic trends and aggregate demand and supply
disturbances, many of which may be unmeasurable.6
In addition to the fixed effects, we consider other possible sources of state-specific
variation in unemployment rates in order to reduce omitted variables bias in our estimates of
the response of unemployment to military spending.7 Unfortunately, most shocks to
regional activity are difficult to measure. Two potential shocks we can measure are oil
6 Among the disturbancescapturedwill be thecommon effects of fluctuations indefense spending across
states.
Of courseone of the main reasons whymilitary spending hasbeen used as an instrumentalvariable in
macroeconometricresearch (e.g., HaD (1938) and Rarney (1989)) is that it is drivenlargelyby non-
economic factors,makingit unlikely that it wouldhavesystematiccorrelation withotherdriving forces.
4 8125,94prices and exchange rates. Oswald (1994) summarizes evidence that realoilprices are an
important determinant of unemployment rates for the industrialized countries. Carruth,
Hooker, and Oswald (1994) find that unemployment in Great Britain and Canada is
positively correlated with real oil prices. Their finding suggests that oil price changes do
not merely cause labor reallocation and search unemployment, since decreases in theprice
of oil are associated with declines in the rate of unemployment. Earlier, Hamilton(1983)
found that oil price shocks appeared to be associated with all butone post-WWll recessions
in the United States. The experience of the mid- 1980s in the United Statessuggests that
real exchangeratefluctuations may also have important differential impacts onregional
unemployment due to state variation in exposure to international competition.
Research on state employment patterns has recently used an industry-mixvariable,
proposed by Bartik (1991), to control for the share of employment changes that can be
associated with industry-specific shocks.8 Since industry employmentgrowth is closely
related to industry unemployment, this variable would also be agood proxy for the effect
of industry shocks on state unemployment rates. Since the Bartilc variable is availableonly
from 1970-1989 and the rest of our data spans 1963-92, we performmost of our analysis
without it, but examine its impact on our estimated model over this subperiod.
We begin by estimating the basic model given by:
(1)U,= 9,+A1 +a1HDBTç +Xfl,.M1L111 +e
where U denotes the unemployment rate, 111)8K denotes the dummy variable for the
source of unemployment data (explained in detail below), NEIL denotes real military
contracts per capita, eandA1 represent time and state effects, respectively, and £ and
index states and time periods.9 The error term,ç,capturesthe influence of unmodelled
See, for example, Davis, et al, (1992) and Blanchard and Katz (1992). 9Afull set of time and state effects is not identified; we normalizebyleaving out the firstyear-dummy.
8125/94factors on the state unemployment rates, which are assumed to be independent and
identically distributed.
The stare fixed effects allow the equilibrium unemployment rates to differ across
states and the time fixed effects allow for a common changes in the equilibrium rates (due
to, say, Federal environmental policy changes) or disequilibrium deviations (e.g. from
Federal tax changes) over time. The lagged unemployment term allows for persistent
deviations of unemployment from its long-run equilibrium rate, without taking a stand on
what the sources of persistence are. Deviations from long-i-un equilibriummay be
persistent either because some shocks are serially conelated or the labor market equilibrates
slowly. We assume that the dynamics of unemployment around its long-mn equilibrium
are the same for all states (i.e., the p's are common across states). Lags of procurement
contracts are included because contract work may be spread over several years and the
impact on the labor market may be delayed. As it is written, this equation suggests that
procurement spending is a determinant of the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate for
each state. Almost all theories of labor markets would imply instead that changesin
procurement spending cause temporary depanures from long-run equilibrium
unemployment. We will test whether the data are consistent with this view.
II. Data
Our unemployment data for each state cover the 1963-1992 period. Weuse CPS
estimates to the maximum extent possible, but for each state there isa transition year
between 1970 and 1976 in which data change from BLS Handbook method estimatesto
CPS estimates. The BLS Handbook series is constructed from dataon payroll,
unemployment insurance, and other work force records that are kept by state employment
security agencies.lO Since the CPS-based estimates are often quite different from the
These lcuIations j1fr1jpOj Reportseries.CPS.basedesUrnatesof the
unemployment rates are available beginning in 1970 for some large states, and in either 1973or1976 for
the remaining slates.
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(HDBK)to capture the level-shift in unemployment rates associated with transition 1mm
handbook to CPS-based rates. The coefficients on these dummies are allowed to vary by
state, since the underlying factors which cause the two series to diverge are likely to vary
across states.t
Our military spending variable is real military contract awards per capita for each of
the 50 states and the District of Columbia. The raw data on contracts come from the DD
350 database, which consists of all prime contracts in excess of $25,000 awarded by the
Department of Defense.'2 Contracts are allocated across states according to the principle
place of performance.'3 Contracts vary in their length, or spend-out rates, which is one
reason why we include a number of lags in estimation. There are a few negative contract
values, which occur when more contracts are canceled than extended to a state in a
particular year. State contract data are deflated by the GDP deflator and the state
population. This has the effect of scaling the magnitude of the real shock to the size of the
affected economy.
Conflicting evidence on the economic importance of military spending cited in the
introduction may be partly a consequence of the small number of observations on aggregate
fluctuations and military spending. The time series on unemployment and military
purchases in the post-WWII period is probably too short to determine the appropriate
specification with confidence and thus to provide conclusive evidence on the issue. These
data on state unemployment rates and procurement expenditures provide us with not only a
The difference between the Handbook and CPS estimates varied by state quite substantially. The major
reason for this is that the handbook method did not represent all types of employment equally well.
Consequently, states with different compositions of urban vs. rural or manufacturing vs. service sector
employment were affected differently by the switch.
12part of our sample, the cutoff value for the database was 510,000 per contract. Since prime
contracts between $10,000 and 525.000 accounted for such a small fraction of total contract awards, we have
ignored this definitional change in the series. In any case, it probably affected all states similarly, so would
have little impact on our results. The exclusion of subcontracts may introduce some noise into the model,
but there is no reason to expect any bias to result from the allocation of subeontracis across states.
For example, a contract with an auto dealer in ArizOna to deliver cars made in Michigan to a base in
Arizona would show up as a contract for the state of Michigan. where most of the value was added.
7 8/25,94greater number of observations,but alsoa samplethat exhibitsgreater variation.'4
Figure 2 displays the average level of procurement spending per capita for the fifty
states and the Disthct of Columbia over the 1963-92 period. The chart reveals large
differences in the economic importance of procurement spending across the states. Figure
3 shows that the time series behavior of procurement spending can differ substantially
across states. In the 1980s, for example, contract awards fell much sooner in Connecticut
and California than in Massachusetts. These differences in the timing of spendingchanges
across states provide us with additional variation to determine the role of procurement
spending in shaping unemployment. Figure 3 also reveals the greater amplitude in state-
level vs. national procurement spending.
State-level relationships between unemployment and procurement spending are not
perfectly analogous to the national relationship. The relatively greater opportunity for
migration across states within a country than across countries leads us to expect that the
relationship between unemployment and military spending is slightly weaker for states than
itisfor the nation as a whole.15 Thus, the state-level analysis will probably lead to an
underestimate of the aggregate impact of procurement spending on unemployment.
Ill. Estimation and Results
We begin by estimating our basic model using OLS over the 1967-1992 period.
Our first exercise is to estimate Equation (1) settingfandKequal to4, which allows for
some dynamics without losing too many data points from our sample.
The results are presented in Table 1. We report two pieces of state-specific
information in the table: the stare-specific fixed effects (and their i-statistics) and an
14Anotheroption would be tocollectdata (or other countries, but we believe that spending per capita has
beensubstantiallygreater inthe United States, so that looking at state data is likely to yield greater
vanalion acrosscross-sectional units and over time.
t5Topel (1986) and more recently Blanchard and Katz (1992) have shown that migration is an important
(actor in the labor market equilibiation process across regions in the United States. Undoubtedly, migration
plays a much smaller role across countries due to stricter immigration policies.
8 8/25/94value calculated from the dependentvariable andresiduals for each staces observations.
The table also reports the estimated time effects and the coefficients on lagged
unemployment and real per capita procurement contracts.
Before discussing the response of unemployment to procurement, we note a few
other features of the estimates. First, the state-specific effects are quite sensible. The low
estimates are found in those states that are widely believed to have low natural rates of
unemployment—Nebraska. New Hampshire. Kansas, and the Dakotas. Chronic high-
unemployment states, such as West Virginia, Michigan, and Alaska, have larger estimated
state constants. The time effects change with overall economic fluctuations. The largest
positive values occur in the recession years of 1975. 1980, 1982, 1983, and 1991.
Whereas expansion years early in the sample tend to have negative estimated time effects,
those in the later years are positive, suggesting a common upward trend in the natural rate
of unemployment over our sample, which is consistent with most previous research on
natural rates of unemployment. Finally, it appeai; that departures from the natural rate of
unemployment have considerable persistence. The first lag of unemployment has an
estimated coefficient of 0.86 and the lag polynomial has a dominant root of 0.70.
The estimated responses of unemployment to contract awards, denoted with jJ's,
are in the lower left of the table. The contemporaneous contract awards have the largest
impact (-0.39) and the only statistically significant coefficient. The sum of all five
coefficients (contemporaneous and four lags) equals -0.45 with a t-statistic of -1.96. This
implies that an increase in procurement contract awards per capita of a thousand 1987
dollars (moving from being one of the least to most procurement-intensive states) would
permanently decrease state unemployment by about half a percentage point
Equation (1) implies that military spending affects the long-mn equilibrium
unemployment rate. Almost all economic theories imply that military spending only affects
deviations from equilibrium—i.e., the long-run equilibrium rate of unemployment in
Massachusetts is unaffected by a permanent change in the level of military contract awards
9 8125/94to thatstate. Since (1) nests specificationswhere changes in procurement spending affect
equilibrium unemployment, wecantestwhether the data accept therestriction implied by
theory.
Our next step is to test whether the basic model accepts the restriction that it is the
changeincontract awards that affects the rate of unemployment, and not the level. The
results of this constrained specification are reported in Table 2. Since the fixed effects and
the lagged unemployment terms change very little with this change in specification, they are
not reported again. The coefficients on the lagged values of the change in procurement
contract awards (denoted by /s), however, are now all significant at the 10% level, and
they and the contemporaneous coefficient are each estimated to be approximately -0.30.
Their sum equals -1.29, (i-statistic =-2.66);the estimated impact on unemployment for the
current drawdown is presented in Figure 5 and discussed below.
The p-value for the test of the restriction that the military contract variable should
enter the specification in first-differences is equal to 0.05, which is at the border of the
rejection region for a standard test. However, our strong theoretical preference for the
natural rate of unemployment to be invariant to the level of military spending, and the
relatively large i-statistics on changes in procurement spending leads us to retain the
restriction for our analysis. We note that while theoretically difficult to rationalize, the data
express some preference for larger cumulative and more permanent effects of procurement
spending on unemployment.
Our next modification to the basic specification is to examine how the response of
unemployment to procurement spending varies across states. Initially we estimated a
modelinwhich /s were allowed to be state-specific. Unfortunately, time variation alone
in this relatively short sample could not precisely estimate the state-specific s. To
alleviate this problem, we chose to group states into five quintiles, with Quinrile 1 having
the lowest levels of real procurement spendingper capita and Quintile 5 having the highest.
This grouping brings in cross sectional variation to help identify the coefficients, and
10 8/25/94allows us to analyze the hypothesis that state responses are heterogeneous based on the
level of spending in that state.
Two mechanisms may be at work underlying this heterogeneity: first, that
dependence on the military sector makes a state more sensitive to a given-sized shock in
that sector, and second, that states have different-sized responses to different-sized shocks
(that is, that the procurement spending-unemployment relationship is nonlinearly increasing
in spending changes). While we estimated with states grouped into quintiles by both of
these measures (the quintile members are presented in Table 3, with the estimates in Table
4A and 4B). a distinction is difficult: states with high procurement spending are also ones
with large changes (the correlation coefficient is 0.83). The sorting by level of
procurement spending leads to more significance in individual coefficients and a
significantly lower sum of squared residuals, so that is the specification we retain for most
of the analysis.
The results of grouping the data in this way and allowing the militaiy spending
coefficient to vary across the groups is presented in Table 3. The response of
unemployment to procurement spending is negaáve for Quintiles 3, 4, and 5, but positive
for Quindles I and 2. The inverse relationship between procurement spending and
unemployment is suongest in Quintile 5, where the sum of the contemporaneous and three
lagged coefficients is -1.82 with a t-statistic of -3.13. All of the individual coefficients in
the 5th quintile are significant at the 10% level and all but one at the 5% level. Two of the
coefficients in Quintile 2 are positive and significant at the 10% level, but neither are
significant at the 5% level.
In order to determine the economic significance of the differences in response
across the quintiles, we simulated the model to estimate the impact of the current
drawdown. For 1987-1992 we use the actual levels of procurement spending for each
state; for 1993-97 we assume that procurement spending will fall an equal percentage each
year to hit the projected 1997 spending amounts found in the 1993 Report of the Defense
11 8125/94Conversion Commission. We also assume that the percentage reduction in spending after
1993 is equal across states. We assume that real per capita contracts remain constant after
1997.
Figures 4A through 4E show the responses with 95% confidence intervals for the
simulation. The first two quintiles show very small effects, with the point estimates
actually indicating a decline in unemployment as a result of reductions in procurement
contracts to those states. The three larger quintiles show adverse effects, with Quintile 5
showing a peak impact around 1995 of an additional 0.4 percentage points of
unemployment associated with the procurement drawdown. In all cases, the effects vanish
by 2003.
Another way to determine the economic significance of these differential responses
across the state groupings is to compare the aggregate implications of the simulated
drawdown under the assumption of identical responses across states venus the assumption
that the response differs across the quintiles. This comparison is shown in Figure 5. With
identical responses across states, the peak impact occurs in 1994 when procurement
cutbacks contribute an estimated 0.11 percentage points to aggregate unemployment
When responses are allowed to differ by quintile, the aggregate implications are greater by
about 40%, with peak impacts in 1993 and 1995 of 0.15 percentage points.
The pattern of response across the quintiles suggests that states with a greater
dependence on procurement spending have larger "elasticities' of unemployment with
respect to procurement spending. In essence, the unemployment "multiplier of
procurement is larger in states with higher levels of spending. We interpret this as
suggesting that the overall response of the economy to defense spending shocks is non-
linear:As thesize of the shock increases, the multiplier effect of the shock becomes larger.
This same phenomenon may have an aggregate time series analog: Periods of large changes
in defense spending may also have proportionately larger unemployment responses. If the
true relationship between unemployment and defense spending is non-linear, then
12 8125/94simulation models that assume a linear relationship may underestimate the response of
unemployment to large changes in defense spending.
In Table 5weadd two new controls to the basic model: oil prices and exchange
rates. While oil price shocks may cause macroeconomic fluctuations that are captured in
the fixed effects to some extent, these shocks have very different state impacts. Oil
exporting states, such as Texas, typically expand when oil prices rise, while oil importing
states whose industrial base is oil dependent, such as Ohio or Pennsylvania, will cpnnact
more than the national avenge during an oil price increase. Exchange rate fluctuations may
also have differential impacts on state unemployment.
Table 5 shows that the allowing for state-specific responses to these shocks does
not change the fundamental finding that procurement spending cuts tend to increase
unemployment (in the model with state responses constrained to be equal) and that these
increases are proportionately larger in states with a higher dependence on procurement
spending (in the model where each quintile has a separate response). The responses to oil
price and exchange rate changes are normalized around Nebraska. Texas, Wyoming,
California, and Alaska are among the few states in which oil price increases have a smaller
adverse impact (and potentially positive impact) than they do in Nebraska. Exchange rate
changes seem to have their greatest impacts on the New England and Midwestern states,
which is consistent with the findings reported by Singleton (1993).
Table 6 adds the Bartik variable to our model which is then estimated over the
shorter sample period during which this series is available (1970-1989). This sample
period misses some of the Vietnam buildup and drawdown and the latter part of the current
drawdown. Table 6A presents the results with the Bartik variable added to the basic model
with quintiles, which is reported as Table 3A. The Bartik variable itself does not
substantially weaken the negative relationship between unemployment and procurement
spending in the 5th Quintile, although it does weaken the relationship for the other
quintiles. The 5th Quintile is the only one to have a negative, statistically significant
13 8i25/94coefficient sum. When all states are constrained to have the same response, the results are
nearly identical to those obtained in the basic model. Table 6B shows the results of adding
the Bartik variable to the expanded model with oil prices and exchange rates, which is
reported in Table 5.Inthis case, the constrained model shows a much weaker relationship,
but the pattern across quintiles does hold up. Quintile 5 still shows a definite negative
relationship between unemployment and procurement contract awards.
Overall, we fmd the evidence fairly convincing that procurement spending has
important short run effects on aggregate unemployment. Our point estimates suggest that
procurement cuts alone will add between one- and two-tenths of a percentage point to
aggregate unemployment during 1994-95, based on the aggregate implications of the
quintiles model. Since procurement cuts constitute only about half of the current
drawdown in military spending, the current drawdown may contribute about two- to four-
tenths of a percentage point to the national unemployment rate in these years.
The more robust finding is that states wid. a higher average level of procurement
spending show a greater unemployment multiplier associated with procurement spending.
This pattern is evident in every specification. Only the ten most procurement-dependent
states exhibit a statistically significant relationship between unemployment and procurement
spending across all specifications. Nonetheless, the aggregate implications are greater
when we recognize this concentration of impacts: Allowing for different unemployment
responses to procurement across states also increased the aggregate sensitivity of
unemployment to procurement spending (Figure 5).
Onepossible explanation for the observed heterogeneity in unemployment
responses to procurement spending is that large regional shocks are exaggerated by
regional character of banking in the United States. Any region-specific shock has a
disproportionate influence on its banks, since their assets are not well diversified
geographically—they hold too many loans to regional businesses, which in turn are
collateralized by regional commercial and residential property. An adverse shock that is
14 8/25/94large enough to cause increases in business failures anddeclinesin property values may
create a "capitalcrunch," eroding bank capital and make lending to small businesses, which
rely almost exclusively on local banks for credit, extremely difficult at precisely the time it
may be needed most Small businesses that'have markets outside the region may be in a
position to absorb labor at relatively low wage rates given the supply of idle workers in the
wakeofthe original regional shock. Unfortunately, they may be unable to obtain credit
from local banks if a capital crunch is underway.
Is there any evidence that defense drawdowns have been associated with capital
crunches? We believe that the recent experience of regional property cycles is certainly
supportive of our view. The recent boom and bust of property values in New England and
California seem to coincide fairly closely with the defense spending cycles over this same
period. The growth and decline in defense spending was much more pronounced in New
England and California than in the remainder of the nation (see Figure 3). The evidence
that regional banking fueled the property boom is also quite striking. Peek and Rosengren
(1992) report evidence that shows real estate assets on the balance sheets of New England
commercial and savings banks rose by 242% from 1984 to 1989, when property values
appeared to peak. For the rest of the nation, growth in real estate assets among FDIC-
insured institutions was only 86%. This burst of lending for real estate development made
the New England banking system vulnerable to the rather sharp decline in property values
that began around 1989. This turning point in regional property values coincides nicely
with an important internadonal event: the fall of the Berlin Wall. Obviously, there were
other important factors that were influencing bank balance sheets and property values at this
time, but given the regional dependence on procurement spending, this shock may have
been the key ingredient. This is something we plan to investigate in future research.
IV. Conclusion
Thispaper has examined the relationship between procurement spendingand
15 8/25/94unemployment rates across states. There are two main findings. First is that military
procurement spending does explain some of the variation in unemployment across states,
and based on our estimates, the current cuts in procurement add about 0.15 percentage
points to the national unemployment rate. The impact of the defense drawdown is likely to
be twice as large, since procurement constitutes less than half of the spending reductions.
Second, we find rather strong evidence in support of a non-linear relationship between
these variables. In particular, procurement shocks cause proportionately larger increases in
unemployment rates in those states with a large share of procurement spending. This may
haveimportantramifications for forecasting the overall economic impact of defense
spending reductions.Inparticular, models that assume a linear relationship between
defense spending and short run economic activity are likely to underestimate the impact of a
defense thawdo'A ronthe economy. It also has obvious ramifications for forecasting the
regional economic impact of spending changes.
Finally, we conjecture that this non-linear relationship between procurement
dependence and unemployment sensitivity is at least partly due to the lack of diversification
of bank assets across regions. A large regional shock is likely to induce regional credit
problems that magnify the impact of the original shock on other firms in the region.
Restrictions on interstate banking may have the unintended consequence of increasing the
amplitude of economic fluctuations. We will explore this possibility in future work.
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Figure 2: Average Procurement Spending by Slateflf24M4 1:09 I'M
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Figure 4b: Empact of MIL, size Quintile 2








Figure 4c: Impact of MR. size Quintile 3
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Figure 5:U.S. Unemployment Rate Impact of the Current Drawdown















Table 1: Equation LI1 =A++ atHBKt+ZPmUit.'TI+flMIL11
pii=l j=0
At
AL 2.05(7.89) 0.91 MT 1,57(6.35) 0.80
AX 2.44(8.69) 0.01 NE 0.60(2.55) - 0.82
AZ 1.67(6.78) 0.76 NV 1.61(6.26) 083
AR 1.83(7.25) 0.88 NH 0.89(3.54) 0.84
CA 1.93(7.57) 0.88 NJ 1.52(5.69) 0.89
Co 1.275.39) 0.78 NM 1.86(6.69) 0.81
CT 1.39(5.77) 0.77 NY 1.69(6.26) 0.88
DE 1.46(6.02) 0.87 NC 1.13(4.39) 0.90
DC 1.99(7.89) 0.84 ND 1.01(4.02) 0.04
FL 1.63(6.72) 0.90 OH 1.85(6.72) 0.94
GA 1.39(5.82) 0.85 OK 1.24(4.84) 0.77
HI 1.31(5.47) 0.64 OR 1.87(6.71) 0.90
ID 1.60(6.50) 0.87 PA 1.79(6.57) 0.97
IL 1.74(7.02) 0.95 RI 1.46(5.53) 0.77 N 1.68(6.80) 0.92 SC 1.41(5.55) 0.91
IA 1.04(4.50) 0.92 SD 0.72(2.91) 0.48
KS 0.88(3.8.4) 0.69 TN 1.67(6.18) 0.93
KY 1.75(7.) 0.89 TX 1.52(5.36) 0.85
LA 2.22(8.30) 0.82 UT 1.19(4.61) 0.16
ME 1.68(6.75) 0.82 VT 1.12(4.35) 0.89
MD 1.27(5.38) 0.87 VA 1.23(4.78) 0.82
MA 1.58(6.51) 0.85 WA 1.98(6.99) 0.84
MI 2.47(9.02) 0.86 WV 2.87(9.48) 0.90
MN 1.14(4.88) 0.84 WI 1.38(5.27) 0.93
MS 2.06(7.95) 0.91 WY 1.22(4.78) 0.74
MO 1.40(5.84) 0.90
-0.29(-1.90) 0.99(4.90)
69 -0.44(.2.79) 2.59 (12.75)
0.81(4.50) 83 1.04(4.73)
0.46(2.55) 84-0,72 (.3)
72 -0.41(.2.23) 0g 0.96(4.43)
673 -0.56(-3.05) 86 0.93(4.36)
074 -0.63(3.51) 0.22(1.04)
675 2.66 (14.75) 88 -0.11(.0.57)
-0.38 (-In) 689 0.13(0.65)
677 0.07(0.33) go 0.54(2.79)
07g -0.29(-1.40) 1.23(6.35)
079 0.39(1.96) 92 0.69(3.50) so 1.70(8.75)
$3 -0.39(-2.2!) P1 0.86 (29.70)
-0.20(-1.07) P2 -0.08(-1.96)
$2 0.0!(0.07) -0.05(-1.27)
-0.06(-0.32) -0.06(.2.15) fl 0.19(1.14)
SSR =685.98;SEE =0.76.N=1326. z-scadstics in parentheses. R2 valuesusecoefficients estimated on
the wholesample andobservations from the start. First year-dummy (1967) excluded for identification.
Handbook dummies(a's) not reportedtosave space.Table 2: Test forWhetherMIL Enters in Differences
-
4 4







SSR 688.20; SEE = 0.76, N=1326. F1,1190 for restriction that MIL enters in differences = 3.85, p-value = 0.05.
t-uthtics in parentheses. First year-dummy(1967)excluded (or identification.State. handbook, and year dummies
are vezy similar to those in the unrestricted specification in Table 1 and thus not reported here.Table 3: Composition of Quintiles
By average size of MIL:
OuintileI: Idaho, Oregon, South Dakota, Kentucky, West Virginia, Nebraska, Montana,
Nevada, Illinois, South Carolina
Ouind!e 2: Arkansas. Iowa, Oklahoma, Wisconsin, North Carolina, Wyoming, Michigan,
Tennessee, Delaware, Alabama
Ouintile 3: Pennsylvania, North Dakota, New Mexico, Louisiana, Ohio, Vermont, Rhode
Island, florida, Minnesota, Maine
Ouintile 4: Indiana, Georgia, New Jersey, Colorado, New Hampshire. Kansas, New
York, Hawaii, Utah, Arizona
Ouintile 5: Mississippi. Texas, Maryland, Washington. Virginia. California, Alaska,
Massachusetts,Missouri,District of Columbia, Connecticut
Byaverage size of MIL differences:
OuincileI: Idaho, North Carolina, Kentucky, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Illinois. Oregon,
SouthCarolina, New Mexico, Iowa
Otindle 2: Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan,
Nevada, New York, South Dakota, Tennessee
Ouindle 3: Florida, Ohio, Minnesota, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, California,
Colorado, Rhode Island, Deleware
Ouintile 4: Vermont, Georgia, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Arizona, New Hampshire, Texas,
Utah, Kansas, Louisiana
Ouintile 5: Wyoming. Alaska, Maine, Montana, Washington, North Dakota, Virginia,
Mississippi, Missouri, Connecticut, District of ColumbiaTable 4a: Ma Responses by Quintile of State Avenge M1L




k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5
1.26 -0.40 -0.77 -0.60
(1.94) (-0.97) (-1.65) (-2.70)
0.18 -0.30 -0.58 -0.41
(0.29) (-0.75) (-1.28) (-1.87)
1.91 -1.34 -0.66 -1.82
(1.25) (-1.28) (-0.69) (-3.13)













1.64 -0.79 -0.72 -0.32













SSR= 674.38 SEE = 0.758. P1=1326.
-0.78 -0.11 0.02 0.07 -0.40





k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5
1.45 -0.10 0.50 0.00 -0.33




0.03 -0.64 -0.19 -0.17






SSR 680.64; SEE = 0.761, N=1326. s-statistics in parentheses.
-0.30
(-1.65)
(0.27) (-0.86) (-1.53) (-2.12)4












+ Ey4M1Lku.j+ ØO1L4, + 81EXCH4
k=i j=O
Table 5: Mit.Responsesby Ma Quintile with Oil Price arid Exchange Rate Controls
Qu in tile
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5
.0i9
(-1.02)
0.27 0.36 -0.53 1.03 -0.28
(0.42) (0.55) (-1.25) (2.06) (-1.32)
0-83 1.53 .0.51 -0.21 -0.45











-0.14 -0.64 0.20 -0.01 0.20 .0.31
(-0.90) (-1.06) (0.40) (-0.03) (0.43) (-1.45)
-0.57 1.19 3.29 -1.47 0.63 -1.37
(-1.12) (0.61) (2.02) (-1.37) (036) (-2.05)
QJL EXCH QJj EXCH
AL 2.40(2.50) -0.34(-1.47)MT 0.14(0A4) -0.12(-0.52)
AK -85 (-0.89) 0.02(0.10) NE
AZ 0.30(0.32) -039(-1.67)NV L07(1.01) -022(-0.89)
AR 1.30(1.35) -034(-1.46)NH 1.26(L22) -030(-2.97)
CA -0.24(-0.25) -0A6(-0.71) NJ 0.88(0.86) -037(-2.43)
Co -0.02(-0.02) -0.32(-1.38)NM .0.03(.0.03) .0.14(-0.61)
CT -0.70(-0.71) .(L24(-1.03)NY 0.37(0.36) -0.41(-1.73)
DE 0.73(0.76) -0A3(-1.88)NC 1.59(1.55) -0.48(-2.04)
DC 1.16(1.21) -0.33(.1.44)ND -1.59(-1.55) 0.15(0.63)
FL 0.26(0.27) -0.42(-1.83) 014 2.44(2.38) .0.36(.1.52)
GA 0-36(0.38) -0.36(-135)OK -0.76(-0.74) -0.02(-0.07)
HI -0.80(-0.83) -01)3(-0.13)OR 2.06(2.01) .0.40(.1.71)
ID 0.66(0.68) -0A8(-0.79)PA 1.61(1.57) -036(-1.53)
IL 1.67(1.75) -032(-lAO)RI 1.88(1.83) -0.80(-3.40)
Th4 2.06(2.15) -0.41(.1.77)SC 2.09(2.04) -0.43(-1.84)
IA 1.46(1.52) -0A3(-037) SD -0.60(.0.58) -0.02(-0.07)
KS -0.22(-0.23) -0.0?(-031)TN 2.20(2.14) -037(-1.57)
KY 1.52(139) -0.23(-1.02)TX -1.69(-L65) 0.04(0.16)
LA 0.04(0.04) 0.15(0.66)lIT 0.30(0.29) -0.14(-0.58)
ME .0.06(.0.06) -0.34(-1.47)VT 0.38(0.37) -044(-1.88)
MD 0.67(0.70) -0.52(-2.26)VA 0.32(0.31) -0.33(-1.40)
MA -0.33(.034) .0.53(-2.29)WA 0.80(0.78) .0.11(-0.49)
MI 2.39(2.49) -046(-1.98)WV 1.56(131) -0.13(—036)
MN 0.41(0.43) -.0.21(-0.89)WI 1.62(1.58) -0.24(-1.04)
MS 1.49(1.55) -0.20(.0.86)WY -1.82(-1.76) 0.26(1.11)
MO 1.39(1.44) -0.40(.1.74)
Notes: SSR=57188 with quintiles; 589.00 with all states constrainedtohave same MR. response (F16,107 =
1.53, p-value0.06);SEE).74,V.73;P4=1326. Oilprice andexchangezate (foreign cuntncyl$) variables do not vary
acrossstatesandare thusnormalized to Nebras&s response foridentification.i-statisticsinparentheses.Table 6: MmResponses by MIL Quintile with Bartik,Oil Priceand ExchangeRate Controls
EquationUj,=+A1+aeHBK + E
m=1 k.rl j0
+OILj + 1WDL1, + piE RTK11
A.Coefficientson iMILk111, Oil and Exchanje Rates Excluded
Ouincile AllStates have
Lag sanieresponse k=l k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5
j =0 -0.03 0.59 043 -0.25 125 -0.25 (-0.15) (0.45) (0.62) (.0.55) (2.38) (-1.15)
1=1 -0.14 0.51 1.58 0.61 -0.05 -0.56
(-0.67) (0.56) (2.17) (1.23) (-0,10) (-2.23) j=2 -0.14 0.55 0.69 0.80 -0.49 -0.41 (-0.69) (0.62) (0.87) (1.61) (-0.93) (-1.63) j=3 -0.29 -0.17 -0.22 0.20 -0.27 -0.40
(-1.63) (-0.26) (-0.33) (0.45) (-0.50) (-1.80)
S7 -0.60 1.49 2.47 L36 0.43 -1.64 (-2.) (0.24) (0.64) (0.77) (0.32) (-3.11)
Notes: SSR=434j4 with quintiles; 445.83 with allstates conslmjned to have same MIL response(F16,851= 1.43, p-value0.11); SEE=0.71410.717; N=l020. Oilprice and exchange rate (foreign cunency/S) variables do notvary acrossstates and are thus normalized to Nebraskj response for identification,i-statistics in parentheses.
B. Coefficients on L%11Lk111, OilandExchangeRates Included
Ouintjje All Stateshave
a response_._kj=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k'S
j —0 0.13 0.32 0.15 -0.09 1.98 -0.20 (0.63) (0.45) (0.20) (-0.17) (3.26) (-0.77) j=1 0AX 0.17 1,62 0.42 0.67 -0.50 (0.02) (0.18) (1.96) (0.72) (1.05) (-1.61) j=2 -0.05 0.32 1.39 0.56 -0.19 -0.45 (-0.22) (0.35) (L49) (0.97) (-0.32) (-1.44) j=3 -0.21 -0.16 0.19 0.i -0.12 -0.41
(-lOS) (-0.24) (0.26) (0.24) (-022) (-1.62) Iy -0.13 0.66 335 1.00 2.33 -1.55 (.019) (0.10) (0.60) (0.39) (0.94) (-1.95)
Notes: SSR=371(yj with quinules; 381.53 withall states constrained to have same MIL response (F16,151= 133, p-vaJue 0.15); SEE=0.703,f1705; N=1020. Oilprice and exchange rate (foreign cun-ency/S) variables do notvary ross states and are thus normalized to Nebraska's
response for identification, i-statistics in parentheses.